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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal policy, institutions, and economic growth and 
also the role of the institution in Asian economies between 1982 and 2001 through the application of 
Pedroni’s Cointegration approach. It examined two different channels through which fiscal policy and 
institutions can affect long-run economic growth in Asian economies. The first channel is when aggregate 
of government expenditure, aggregate of other fiscal variables, and the institution affect the real per 
capita Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and the second channel is to determine the role of institutions 
on the real per capita GDP.  The Pedroni Cointegration result established a long-run relationship 
between fiscal policy, institution, and economic growth. We found a positive and statistically significant 
impact of aggregate of government expenditure and aggregate of other fiscal variables and institution 
on real per capita GDP. We also found that there is a role of institutions on the real per capita GDP. 
JEL Classification: C23, H30, H50, O47
Keywords: Economic Growth; Institutions; Aggregate of Government Expenditure; Aggregate of Fiscal 
Policy; Panel Cointegration; FMOLS.
ABSTRAK
Kertas ini menyiasat hubungan antara dasar fiskal, institusi dan pertumbuhan ekonomi dan juga peranan 
institusi di dalam ekonomi Asia antara 1982 dan 2001 melalui aplikasi pendekatan ko-integrasi Pedroni. 
Ianya memeriksa dua saluran yang berbeza iaitu melalui dasar fiskal dan institusi yang mana dijangka 
boleh memberi kesan jangka panjang pertumbuhan ekonomi di dalam ekonomi Asia. Saluran pertama 
adalah apabila aggregat perbelanjaan kerajaan, aggregat pembolehubah fiskal lain dan institusi 
dapat memberi kesan pada Keluaran Dalam Negara Kasar (KDNK) benar per kapita. dan saluran 
kedua adalah untuk menentukan peranan institusi ke atas KDNK benar per kapita. Hasil keputusan 
ko-integrasi Pedroni ini menunjukkan wujudnya hubungan jangka panjang  antara dasar fiskal, institusi 
dan pertumbuhan ekonomi. Kami dapati bahawa terdapat impak yang signifikan dan positif aggregat 
perbelanjaan kerajaan dan aggregat pembolehubah fiskal lain dan institusi ke atas KDNK benar per 
kapita. Kami juga dapati bahawa adanya peranan institusi ke atas KDNK benar per kapita. 
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INTRODUCTION
In Asian countries, efficiency of the role of 
institutions is sadly lacking, and there are 
numerous deficiencies in the functioning of 
the role of institutions. Institutions mostly 
thrive on informal networks of political and 
family connections. There is a certain lack of 
transparency and accountability in the operation 
of governmental role of institutions in Asian 
countries. This type of institutional operation 
has not only resulted in large transactional costs, 
but has also created political and economic 
uncertainty in the region.
 The framework of institutions comprises 
the legal rules and norms that constrain the 
behaviour of policy-makers. Legal rules and norms 
should also guarantee that government actions do 
not undermine but rather support the functioning 
of economic growth. Government actions should 
be limited and well constrained by appropriate 
institutions. Rules and norms can enhance the 
efficiency of fiscal policies and reduce the scope 
for rent seeking. Institutions can also secure the 
stability of fiscal policies by preventing erratic 
changes in deficit, tax laws, and expenditure 
programmes. Generally, we concluded that there 
is evidence which suggests that institutions are 
important determinants of economic growth. 
Government policies and institutions seem to play 
an important role, policies and institutions that 
minimise rent seeking and attract investment are 
correlated with higher growth. 
 Fiscal policies have a benign role for 
economic growth in the region, namely to provide 
a stable macro-environment for investment. The 
changed environment of liquidity constraints 
on external borrowing and slowdown in output 
growth has led to new attention being directed 
toward the role and contribution of fiscal policy 
to reviving growth in the region (Gangopadhyay 
& Chatterji, 2005). In the debate on economic 
policy, fiscal policy is predominantly viewed as 
an instrument to mitigate short-run fluctuations 
of output and employment. By a variation in 
government spending or taxation, fiscal policy 
aims at altering aggregate demand in order to 
move the economy closer to potential output. 
 There are many non-economic factors 
which interact with the economic growth process, 
e.g. institutional economics in North and Thomas 
(1973), and North (1990) who examined the link 
between economic development and institutions, 
while there is a tradition in political science 
revealed in Lipset (1959) who explained political 
institutions, and democracy in terms of economic 
development. 
 Economic agents may interact in many 
different ways. Certain agents may only be able 
to trade with certain others; some agents may 
try to make inferences from the activities of 
others. Agents may change their expectations 
as a function of the expectations of others with 
who they are in contact with. A first approach to 
analysing this sort of problem is to stay within 
the standard framework and to define a suitable 
sort of static equilibrium, which takes account 
of interaction. The latter may be local or global, 
that is, in the first case, agents will be limited as 
to whom they have contact with, in the second, 
agents may meet any other agent. 
 The objective of this study was to 
determine the long-run relationship fiscal policy, 
institutions, and economic growth, and determine 
the role of institutions on economic growth and 
whether institutions require complimentary factors 
to influence economic growth through interaction 
term effects. Thus, this study aimed at filling a 
gap in research devoted solely to achieving the 
objectives using newly developed methods of 
panel cointegration by Pedroni (2004, 2001) and 
panel FMOLS estimator (Pedroni, 1996; Pedroni, 
2000). 
 This paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 contains a brief literature review, while 
in section 3, the model is applied to the 13 Asian 
economies. Section 4 presents empirical results 
and conclusion is in the final section. 
REVIEW OF RELATED 
LITERATURE
The most recent empirical literature, mainly 
based on panel data regressions, showed that 
economic growth is significantly affected by 
fiscal policies, although there remains some lack 
of agreement on the sign of these effects. On 
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the other hand, Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort, 
(1996) found robust positive contribution of the 
government expenditure ratio (net of defence and 
educational expenditure) to growth. In a similar 
way, Kneller,Bleaney, and Kneller, (1999) found 
that public expenditure and taxation only affected 
growth if they were productive and distortionary, 
productive government expenditure was found to 
positively affect growth, whereas distortionary 
taxation was found to be harmful for growth. 
With this distinction, they argued that both sides 
of the government budget should be considered in 
estimating the impact of fiscal policy on growth, 
as their financing offsets the growth-enhancing 
effects of productive expenditure. Gerson (1998) 
surveyed the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the effect of fiscal policy variables (government 
expenditure programmes and taxes) on economic 
growth. He concluded that educational attainment 
and public health status had significant, positive 
effects on per capita output growth; economies that 
were open to international trade grew faster than 
those that were closed, therefore fiscal policies that 
encouraged openness should encourage growth. 
 Zagler and Dürnecker (2003) surveyed 
the literature on fiscal policy and economic 
growth. They presented a unifying framework 
for the analysis of long-run growth implications 
of government expenditures and revenues. They 
found that the level of education expenditure and 
the growth rate of public infrastructure investment 
both exhibited a positive impact on the growth rate 
of the economy. Tanzi and Zee (1997) examined 
systematically the various ways that main fiscal 
instruments (tax policy, public expenditure policy, 
and budget policy) influenced economic growth 
through their impact on the determinants of 
growth. 
 The question of how institutions fit 
into a theory of economic growth depends not 
only on what one means by institutions, but also 
on the other aspects of that theory. Rodrick, 
Subramaniam, and Trebbi, (2002) concluded that 
institutions ruled over other potential determinants 
of growth and, in particular, geographic variables 
had a strong impact on institutions but little or no 
effect on growth beyond the institutional linkage. 
That means quality of institutions overrides 
geography and integration (international trade) in 
explaining cross-country income levels. Rodrick 
(1997) found that an index of institutional quality 
[drawn from work by Knack and Keefer (1995) 
and Easterly and Levine (1997) did exceptionally 
well in rank-ordering East Asian countries 
according to their growth performance. 
 North (1990) had argued that it was a 
country’s institutions that determined its long-
run economic performance, by defining the way 
its political/economic system operated.  North 
identified the government’s enforcement of 
property rights, and the regulations it imposed 
as the most important determinants of economic 
performance. These institutions clearly could have 
a significant effect on the Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) of a country’s economic system.
 Leblang (1996) had found that there 
was a positive correlation between economic and 
political freedom on the one hand and economic 
growth on the other. Goldsmith (1995) also found 
that both economic and political freedom were 
correlated with economic growth. Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997) found little evidence that political 
systems affected growth, but did not examine 
economic institutions. Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Block, (1996) had developed a measure 
of economic freedom that was independent of 
political freedom, and their analysis indicated that 
there was a simple correlation between economic 
freedom and growth. Barro (1996) concluded 
that after adjusting for various economic factors, 
democracy had, if anything, a negative impact on 
economic growth. 
 Rodrik et al. (2002) followed this analysis 
in treating current institutions as a stock that had 
been created by a past flow of good or bad policies, 
that was, by the operation of past institutions. 
Results thus rely upon current measures of rule 
of law. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
found that once the effect of resource flowing on 
institutions (with an emphasis on rule of law) was 
accounted for, resources had no effect or a small 
positive effect on growth rates of per capita GDP. 
Law and Demetriades (2006) examined whether 
the institution was an important determinant of 
financial development by using dynamic panel 
data techniques. They found that the institution 
variable was a statistically significant determinant 
of financial development in all models. 
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 Chen and Gupta (2006) examined the 
structural factors that may have an effect on 
economic growth. They worked with panel data 
where observations were pooled on a cross-section 
over a period of time. They began with a linear 
growth regression specification and then extended 
it to account for interaction terms. The interaction 
terms were between a variable to measure for 
openness and the various structural factors such as 
education, financial depth, public expenditure on 
education and health, and the inflation rate. They 
found that the interaction term between openness 
and government expenditure on health and 
education, and openness and financial depth have 
positive coefficients. This implied that economies 
where the government spends more on education 
and health and is relatively financially developed; 
openness will have a positive effect on growth.
 Law and Demetriades (2006) found 
that the coefficient on the models containing the 
interaction term demonstrates that interaction 
between capital inflows and import duties are 
positive and has a highly significant influence on 
financial development. Borensztein, De Gregorio, 
and Lee, (1998) detected a positive and significant 
interaction between the stock of human capital and 
FDI. Eller, Haiss, and Steiner, (2006) implemented 
a second improvement interaction term between 
the stock of FSFDI and the stock of human and 
physical capital. They found that the interaction 
of the FSFDI stock with the index of employee 
education has a positive impact on economic 
growth; the interaction of the FSFDI stock with the 
stock of physical capital is associated negatively to 
growth. They also considered the positive human 
capital-related interaction term – they detected 
complementary effects between FSFDI and 
human capital on economic growth, and FSFDI 
seemed to spur economic growth depending on a 
higher human capital stock.
 Benos (2005) used the following 
interaction terms: SY=SSY*Y, EY=EDY*Y, 
HEY=HY*Y, where SSY is social spending as 
fraction of GDP, Y is GDP per capita and EDY, 
HY stands for government spending on education, 
and health respectively as a proportion of GDP. 
The inclusion of these terms tests the hypotheses 
that the impact of expenditures on social security-
social assistance, education and health varies with 
the GDP per capita of the countries. This way, 
he allowed for heterogeneity of the coefficients 
of government spending on education, health, 
and social services across countries. He also 
found that the interaction term SY was negative 
and statistically significant in three out of six 
estimations implying that the influence of social 
spending on growth might weaken the higher the 
level of development of a country. The effect of 
health expenditure seems to be stronger the richer 
a country is, although the relevant variable, HEY, 
is not statistically significant most of the time. This 
sort of impact suggests the possibility of positive 
externalities of better nutrition, housing, and social 
infrastructure in wealthier countries, on health 
spending.
 Building on this prior work, this paper 
seeks to identify more precisely the characteristics 
conducive to economic growth and the key 
institutional and policy factors that contribute to 
differences in growth rates across countries.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
As follow Hoeffler (2002), in the Solow’s 
model growth in output per worker depends on 
initial output per worker [y(0)], the initial level 
of technology [A(0)], the rate of technological 
progress (g), the savings rate (s), the growth 
rate of the labour force (n), the depreciation rate 
(δ), and the share of capital in output (α). Thus, 
the model predicts that a high saving rate will 
affect growth in output per worker positively, 
whereas high labour force growth (corrected by 
the rate of technological progress and the rate of 
depreciation) will have a negative effect on growth 
in output per worker. The basic Solow model can 
be transformed in the following form:
                                                         
where )(ty denotes the logarithm of output per 
worker in period t.
 In the augmented version of the Solow 
model investment, human capital is an additional 
determinant of growth in output per worker
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                                                          (2)
where ks and hs denote the proportion of 
output invested in physical and human capital, 
respectively.
 Equations (1) and (2) had been used as 
a framework for empirical analysis by Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil, (1992), Islam (1995), and 
Caselli et al. (1996). In this section, a simple model 
is set out and provides an organising framework 
for thinking about the ways in which the aggregate 
of government expenditure, aggregate of other 
fiscal variables, and institutions affect growth. 
Therefore, we adopted the framework introduced 
by Mankiw et al. (1992), Demetriades and Law 
(2006), Ghura and Hadjimichael (1996), Hoeffler 
(2002), and Knight, Looyza, and Villanueva, 
(1993). This study provides a growth model 
from the conventional growth accounting 
framework and the production function below 
takes the standard neoclassical form with a minor 
modification which includes human capital in the 
Cobb-Douglas production function:
     (3)
where Y is real output at time t, K  and L are the 
stocks of physical capital and labour, respectively, 
at time t, H  is the stock of human capital, A  is a 
similar measure for physical capital, and α and β  
the share of capital and human capital on output. A 
is a labour-augmenting factor reflecting the level 
of technological development and efficiency in 
the economy and the subscript t indicates time. 
This equation states merely that at any moment, 
the total output of the economy depends on the 
quantity and quality of physical capital employed, 
the quantity of labour employed, and the average 
level of skills of the labour force. Output can 
only increase if K, L, A, or H also increases, and 
perpetual increases in output per worker can 
only occur if the stock of capital per worker or 
the average quality of labour or of capital also 
increases perpetually.
 We assumed that 1<+ βα  which 
implies that there are decreasing returns to 
all capital raw labour and labour-augmenting 
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technologies, which are assumed to grow 
according to the following functions:
                                                               
                                                        (4)
     
                        (5) 
where n is the exogenous rate of growth of 
the labour force, g is the exogenous rate of 
technological progress, P is the variable vectors 
of government expenditure and fiscal policy that 
can affect the level of technology and efficiency 
in the economy, and θ is a vector of coefficient 
related to these variables. 
 Demetriades and Law (2006) stated that 
variable A depends on exogenous technological 
improvements and the level of other variables. 
Variable A in this study differed from A used 
by Mankiw et al. (1992). This modification is 
more likely to be particularly relevant to the 
empirical cases of the link between government 
expenditure, fiscal policy, and economic growth. 
The technological improvements are encouraged 
by development in public investment spending and 
fiscal policy, which tend to contribute to economic 
growth (Ramirez & Nazmi, 2003). 
 In a steady state (denoted as a * in the 
equation), output per worker grows at the constant 
rate g, which is the exogenous component of 
the growth rate of the efficiency variable A 
(Demetriades & Law, 2006). Hence, this output 
can be obtained directly from the definition of 
output per effective worker as follows:
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Taking logs both of Equation (6) and log income 
per worker at a given time; time 0 for simplicity 
is
      
                                                                         (7)
where 
The main equation of this model used for 
estimation purposes in equation (8) below:
                                                          
    (8)
 Equations (8) indicates a steady state 
output per worker or labour productivity where a 
vector of government expenditure and fiscal policy 
proxies exist, while ks  is the savings in physical 
capital, hs  is the savings in human capital, and 
δ is the rate of depreciation.
 Before we proceed to estimate the model, 
it is necessary to write equation (8) in terms of per 
capita output. Note again that for Mankiw et al. 
(1992) as bellow:
                                            (9)
On the other hand, for Islam (1995) and Caselli 
et al. (1996) as below:
                             (10)
Our model differed from Caselli et al. (1996) and 
Islam (1995) where we assumed that hs and gt do 
not vary over time but ks and n can be assumed 
to vary over time. This means that,        ,  gt,and 
hs can be considered as a constant term 0A . 
Therefore, the steady-state output per worker or 
labour productivity )( ∗y grows according to the 
following equation:
  
                 
                                       (11)
 The above equation introduced a set of 
variables (P) which was assumed as exogenous 
that could affect economic growth in the long 
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run. With the introduction of endogenous growth 
theory, P was no longer assumed as exogenous. The 
endogenous treatment of P allowed us to suggest a 
possible set of explanatory variables. This model 
differed from neoclassical production functions 
in two important categories of variables namely 
technology related variables and policy related 
variables. The key assumption about productivity 
growth here was that a typical developing county 
purchases technology knowledge abroad from 
various suppliers. What technology purchased 
depends on the price of foreign technology as 
well as trade and exchanged rate policies that 
impact the final cost of the imported technology 
(Ramirez & Nazmi, 2003). In our model, we 
concentrated on policy related variables and we 
introduced government expenditure and fiscal 
policy, which were included as a proxy for policy 
related variables.
Then proposed Basic Model was given as:
itititkitit gnSGOVPOLY εδββββ +++−++= )ln(lnlnln 3210 			(12)
                            
where Y
it
 is real GDP per capita, GOVPOL
it
 is a 
control variable of fiscal policy and institutions, 
S
kit
 is the savings in physical capital, (n+g+δ): 
n is the rate of labour growth, g is the rate of 
technology growth or technological progress, 
and δ is the rate of depreciation. The addition 
of g and δ  was assumed to be constant across 
countries and over time, following Islam (1995), 
Mankiw et al. (1992), and Caselli et al. (1996), 
technological progress and the depreciation rate 
were assumed to be constant across countries and 
that they sum up to 0.05. The natural logarithm of 
the sum of population growth was 0.05 and was 
calculated for (n+g+δ). The β
0
 is a constant term 
and β
1
, β
2
, and β
3
 are estimated parameters in the 
model, while ε
it
 is an error term.
 In order to examine the aggregate of 
government expenditure, aggregate of fiscal 
policy, institutions, and the interaction effects 
between aggregate of government expenditure 
variables, and institutions, and aggregate of fiscal 
policy variables, and institutions on economic 
growth, Equation (12) was extended to include the 
institutions and an interaction term, as follows:
θPgteAtA += )0()( 	
0ln A 	ht
tp
://
m
m
j.u
um
.e
du
.m
y
123
Model 1
                 (13)
Model 2
                               (14)
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where  Y
it
  is a real GDP per capita, GE
it
 is an 
aggregate of government expenditure variables 
as a share of GDP (obtained by summing up the 
government expenditure on health, education, and 
defense), OFV
it
 is an aggregate of independent 
fiscal policy variables as a share of GDP (obtained 
by summing up public sector wages and salaries, 
expenditure on other goods and services, transfers 
and subsidies, interest payment on government 
debt, capital expenditure (minus government 
expenditure on health, education and defense), 
tax revenue, non-tax revenue, and grant). S
kit
 and 
(n+g+δ) are as defined earlier in equation (12). 
In addition, INS
it
 is an institutions indicator which 
is obtained by summing up the five indicators 
(corruption, bureaucratic quality, rule of law, 
government repudiation of contracts, and risk of 
expropriation), (GE*INS) and (OFV*INS) are 
interactions between the aggregate of government 
expenditure variables and institutions, and the 
aggregate of other fiscal variables and institutions, 
i is a cross-section data for countries referred to, 
and t is a time series data, while ε
it
 is an error term. 
The constant is denoted as β
0
 while β
1
-β
6
 are the 
coefficients showing how much a one unit increase 
in each individual variable will affect the growth 
rate in economic growth. 
Panel Unit Root Tests Estimation Procedure
In order to investigate the possibility of panel 
cointegration, it is first necessary to determine 
whether real per capita GDP (as dependent 
variable) and the independent variables evolve 
as unit root processes. There are several unit root 
tests specifically for panel data which have been 
introduced in past decades.  Each panel unit root 
test data has its own benefits and limitations and 
for this study we have chosen the Levin, Lin, and 
Chu (denoted as LLC; 2002), Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (denoted as IPS; 1997), and Maddala and Wu 
(denoted as MW; 1999), which were based on the 
well-known Dickey-Fuller procedure. 
We started with LLC which found that the main 
hypothesis of panel unit root is as follows:
  
                                         m=1,2,…(15)
where y
i,t  
refers to variable lnrgdpc
it
 lnGE
it
, lnOFV
it
, 
lnS
kit
, 
                                                 
and ∆  refers to the first 
difference. The hypothesis test is 0:0 =ΦiH  
for existence of unit root whereas 0: <ΦiaH  
for all i for non-existence of unit root.  As ip  is 
unknown, LLC suggested a three-step procedure 
in the test.  In the first step; obtain the Augmented 
Dickey-fuller (ADF) regression which has been 
separated for each individual in the panel, generate 
two orthogonalised residuals. The second step 
requires an estimation of the ratio of long-run to 
short-run innovation standard deviation for each 
individual. The last step requires us to compute 
the pooled t-statistics. 
 IPS proposed a test for the presence of 
unit roots in panels that combines information 
from the time series dimension with that from 
the cross section dimension, such that fewer time 
observations are required for the test to have 
power. Since the IPS test has been found to have 
superior test power by researchers in economics 
to analyse long-run relationships in panel data, we 
also employed this procedure in this study. IPS 
begins by specifying a separate ADF regression 
for each cross-section with individual effects and 
no time trend as follows:
                                      
                                                                       (16)
where  i = 1, . . ., N and t = 1, . . ., T
IPS used separate unit root tests for the N cross-
section units. Their test was based on the ADF 
statistics averaged across groups. After estimating 
the separate ADF regressions, the average of 
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the t-statistics for 1p  from the individual ADF 
regressions, )( iiT pt i was:
                                                               
                                                                       (17)
The t-bar was then standardised and it was shown 
that the standardised t-bar statistic converges to the 
standard normal distribution as N and T ∞→ .
Finally, MW developed a test based in the 
probability values of all root unit individual tests. 
An alternative approach to panel unit root tests 
uses Fisher’s (1932) results to derive tests that 
combine the p-values from individual unit root 
tests. The statistic is given by:
                (18)
where iπ  is the p-value of the test statistic in 
unit i, and is distributed as a )2(2 Nχ  under the 
usual assumption of cross-sectional independence. 
When the Fisher test is based on ADF test 
statistics, we must specify the number of lags used 
in each cross-section ADF regression. Maddala 
and Wu (1999), showed that it is more powerful 
than the t-bar in IPS test. 
Panel Cointegration Tests
The next step was to test for the existence of a 
relationship between the real per capita GDP 
growth rates and the independent variables using 
panel cointegration tests suggested by Pedroni 
(1999, 2004). We made use of seven panel 
cointegrations by Pedroni (1999, 2004), since he 
determined the appropriateness of the tests to be 
applied to estimated residuals from a cointegration 
regression after normalising the panel statistics 
with correction terms. 
The procedures proposed by Pedroni make use of 
estimated residual from the hypothesised long-
run regression of the following form (Pedroni, 
1999): 
                                                        
                (19)
for t = 1,…,T; i = 1,…,N; m = 1, …, M, 
∑
=
=
N
i
iiiTNT ptN
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1
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1 β 	
∑
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N
i
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1
2
2)log(2 χπ 	
where T is the number of observations over time, 
N is the number of cross-sectional units in the 
panel, and M is number of regressors. In this set 
up, iα  is the member specific intercept or fixed 
effects parameter which varies across individual 
cross-sectional units. The same is true of the slope 
coefficients and member specific time effects, 
tiδ . 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposed the heterogeneous 
panel and heterogeneous group mean panel 
test statistics to test for panel cointegration as 
follows:
1. Panel v-statistic:
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2. Panel ρ-Statistic:
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3. Panel t-Statistic (non-parametric):
                                                                (22)
4. Panel t-Statistic (parametric): 
                                                                        
                                                                       (23)
5. Group ρ-Statistic:
                                                                (24)
6. Group t-Statistic (non-parametric);
      
                                                                (25)
7. Group t-Statistic (parametric):
                                                                (26)
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where
         
and 
  
where the residuals ,ˆ,ˆ *,, titi µµ and ti,ηˆ are 
obtained from the following regressions:
      
Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) 
Estimation
In this section, we adopted FMOLS procedure 
from Christopoulos and Tsionas (2003). In order 
to obtain asymptotically efficient consistent 
estimates in panel series, non-exogeneity and serial 
correlation problems are tackled by employing 
fully modified OLS (FMOLS) introduced by 
Pedroni (1996). Since the explanatory variables 
are cointegrated with a time trend, and thus a 
long-run equilibrium relationship exists among 
these variables through the panel unit root test 
and panel cointegration test, we proceeded to 
estimate Equation (13) to Equation (14) by the 
method or fully modified OLS (FMOLS) for 
heterogenous cointegrated panels (Pedroni, 1996, 
2000). This methodology allows consistent and 
efficient estimation of cointegration vectors and 
also addresses the problem of non-stationary 
regressors, as well as the problem of simultaneity 
biases. It is well known that OLS estimation 
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yields biased results because the regressors 
are endogenously determined in the I(1) case. 
The starting point OLS is as in the following 
cointegrated system for panel data:
                                                                 
                                                                       (27)
where [ ]ititit e εξ ′= ,  is the stationary with 
covariance matrix iΩ . The estimator β  will be 
consistent when the error process ],[ ′′+ ititit e εω
satisfies the assumption of cointegration between 
ity and itx . The limiting distribution of OLS 
estimator depends upon nuisance parameters. 
Following Phillips and Hansen (1990), a semi-
parametric correction can be made to the OLS 
estimator that eliminates the second order 
bias caused by the fact that the regressors are 
endogenous. Pedroni (1996, 2000) followed the 
same principle in the panel data context, and 
allowed for the heterogeneity in the short- run 
dynamics and fixed effects. FMOLS Pedroni’s 
estimator was constructed as follow:
                                          (28)
where the covariance matrix can be decomposed 
as iiii Γ+Γ+Ω=Ω
0 ,  where 0iΩ  is  the 
contemporaneous covariance matrix, and iΓ  is 
a weighted sum of autocovariances. Also, 0ˆ iΩ
denotes an appropriate estimator of 0iΩ .
 In this study, we employed both the 
within-dimension and between-dimension panel 
FMOLS tests from Pedroni (1996, 2000). An 
important advantage of the between-dimension 
estimators is that the form in which the pooled 
data allows for greater flexibility in the presence 
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of heterogeneity of the cointegrating vectors. 
Specifically, whereas test statistics constructed 
from the within-dimension estimators are designed 
to test the null hypothesis 00 : ββ =iH  
for all I against the alternative hypothesis 
0: βββ ≠= AiAH where the value Aβ is the 
same for all i, test statistics constructed from the 
between-dimension estimators are designed to 
test the null hypothesis 00 : ββ =iH for all i 
against the alternative hypothesis 0: ββ ≠iAH , 
so that the values for iβ are not constrained to be 
the same under the alternative hypothesis. Clearly, 
this is an important advantage for applications 
such as the present one, because there is no reason 
to believe that, if the cointegrating slopes are not 
equal to one, they necessarily take on some other 
arbitrary common value. Another advantage of 
the between-dimension estimators is that the 
point estimates have a more useful interpretation 
in the event that the true cointegrating vectors 
are heterogeneous. Specifically, point estimates 
for the between-dimension estimator can be 
interpreted as the mean value for the cointegrating 
vectors. This is not true for the within-dimension 
estimators (Pedroni, 2001).
DATA AND CHOICE OF VARIABLES
The data set consisted of a panel of observations 
for 13 Asian countries, namely China, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka for the period 1982-2001. All data 
were collected from the World Development 
Indicator (World Bank CD-ROM 2005), Asian 
Development Bank 2004, and The Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS) for the various years. All 
these data were converted to US dollars based on 
year 2000 constant prices. 
 Following Demetriades and Law (2006), 
the data set on institutional quality indicators 
employed from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) – a monthly publication of Political 
Risk Services (PRS) – five PRS indicators 
were used to measure the overall institutional 
environment, namely: (i) Corruption, which 
reflects the likelihood that officials will demand 
illegal payment or use their position or power to 
their own advantage; (ii) Rule of Law, which reveals 
the degree to which citizens are willing to accept 
established institutions to make and implement 
laws, and to adjudicate disputes, which can also 
be interpreted as a measure of rule obedience 
(Clague, 1993) or government credibility; (iii) 
Bureaucratic Quality, which represents autonomy 
from political pressure, strength, and expertise 
to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services, as well 
as the existence of an established mechanism 
for recruitment and training of bureaucrats; (iv) 
Government Repudiation of Contracts, which 
describes the risk of a modification in a contract 
taking due to change in government priorities; and 
(v) Risk of Expropriation, which reflects the risk 
that the rules of the game may be abruptly changed. 
The above first three variables were scaled from 
0 to 6, whereas the last two variables were scaled 
from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate better rating 
for institutional quality and vice versa. The scale 
of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and rule of law 
was first converted to 0 to 10 (multiplying them 
by 5/3) to make them comparable to the other 
indicators. The institution indicator was obtained 
by summing up the above six indicators.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1a and Table 1b report the results of the LLC, 
IPS, and MW panel unit root tests for the data on 
aggregate of government expenditure variables 
(GE), aggregate of other fiscal variables (OFV), 
institutions (INS), savings rate (s
k
,), population 
growth rate (n+g+δ), interactions of aggregate of 
government expenditure variables in institutions 
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(GE*INS), and interaction of aggregate of other 
fiscal variables in institutions (OFV*INS) for both 
the scenarios of constant and constant plus time 
trend term. The tests were run for the full sample 
of 13 countries and over the period 1982 to 2001. 
Table 1a indicates that all variables are I(0) in the 
constant of the panel unit root regression. These 
results clearly showed that the null hypothesis of 
a panel unit root in the level of the series cannot 
be rejected at various lag lengths. We assumed 
that there was no time trend. Therefore, we tested 
for stationarity allowing for a constant plus time 
trend. In the absence of a constant plus time trend, 
again we found that the null hypothesis of having 
panel unit root is generally rejected in all series at 
level form and various lag lengths. 
 As discussed above, we concluded that 
most of the variables are non-stationary in with 
and without time trend specifications at level by 
applying the LLC, IPS, and MW tests, which were 
also applied for heterogeneous panel to test the 
series for the presence of a unit root. The results 
of the panel unit root tests confirmed that the 
variables were non-stationary at level. 
Table 1a: Panel Unit Root Tests: Level
CONSTANT CONSTANT + TREND
LLC IPS MW LLC IPS MW
lnrgdpc -0.35(5) 1.72(0) 21.81(1) 2.1192) 1.15(1) 30.44(1)
lnGE -1.52(0) 3.52(0) 17.41(0) 3.34(0) 1.58(1) 13.73(1)
lnOFV -0.99(0) 3.51(0) 9.33(0) 0.42(1) -0.59(0) 25.08(1)
lnINS 0.04(0) 1.75(0) 12.95(0) 0.29(0) 1.04(0) 18.12(0)
lnS
k
0.10(0) -0.71(0) 33.11(0) 1.73(2) -0.03(0) 25.25(0)
(n+g+δ) -1.08(2) -0.51(4) 22.38(4) 0.12(2) -0.77(2) 28.97(2)
(GE*INS) -1.84(0) 3.26(0) 13.99(0) 1.97(0) 3.18(1) 19.21(1)
(OFV*INS) -1.21(0) 3.18(0) 12.02(0) 1.60(0) 2.61(1) 12.59(1)
Notes:  The number in {  } denotes lag length, the lag length was chosen on the basis of the Akaike’s Information 
Criteria (AIC) where we specified maximum lag order (k) in autoregression and then we selected appropriate lag 
order according to the AIC.
For LLC t-stat all reported values were distributed N(0,1) under null of unit root or no cointegration.
 Table 1b presents the results of the tests 
at first difference for LLC, IPS, and MW tests in 
constant and constant plus time trend. We can 
see that for all series, the null hypothesis of unit 
root test was rejected at 95% critical value (1% 
level). Hence, based on LLC, IPS, and MW tests, 
there was evidence that all the series are in fact 
integrated of order one.  
 We concluded that the results of panel 
unit root tests (LLC, IPS, and MW tests), reported 
in Table 1b, support the hypothesis of a unit 
root in all variables across countries, as well as 
the hypothesis of zero order integration in first 
differences. At most of the 1% significance level, 
we found that all test statistics in both with and 
without trends significantly confirm that all series 
strongly reject the unit root null. The presence of 
unit root in the variables also indicated that all 
the independent variables lnGE,  lnOFV,  lnINS, 
lnS
k
, ln(n+g+δ), ln(GE*INS), ln(OFV*INS), 
and dependent variables (lnrgdpc) are in fact 
integrated of order one, or are I(1) processed when 
the individual country data were pooled together. 
The findings of a unit root on the variables in this 
study are consistent with the results of a number 
of previous studies, such as Campbell and Perron 
(1991), McCoskey and Selden (1998), Macdonald 
and Nagayasu (2000), Lee and Chang (2006), and 
Al-Awad and Harb (2005). 
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Table 1b: Panel Unit Root Tests: First Difference
CONSTANT CONSTANT + TREND
LLC IPS MW LLC IPS MW
lnrgdpc -7.51(0)* -5.57(0)* 75.95(0)* -8.25(0)* -5.30(0)* 71.07(0)*
-5.00(0)* -4.69(0)* 67.90(0)* -5.49(0)* -3.78(0)* 56.40(0)*
lnGE -14.17(0)* -12.74(0)* 172.04(0)* -13.29(0)* -11.77(0)* 144.00(0)*
lnOFV -7.49(0)* -5.89(0)* 79.39(0)* -6.68(0)* -3.37(0)* 49.39(0)*
lnINS -10.64(0)* -9.03(0)* 121.18(0)* -9.42(0)* -6.53(0)* 85.39(0)*
lnS
k
-19.09(0)* -17.09(0)* 230.74(0)* -16.87(0)* -15.26(0)* 185.03(0)*
(n+g+δ) -7.61(0)* -8.88(0)* 121.80(0)* -9.02(0)* -8.58(0)* 110.92(0)*
(GE*INS) -9.16(0)* -8.81(0)* 118.58(0)* -9.34(0)* -8.00(0)* 101.03(0)*
Notes:  The number in {  } denote lag length, the lag length was chosen on the basis of Akaike’s Information 
Criteria (AIC) where we specified maximum lag order (k) in autoregression and then we selected appropriate lag 
order according to AIC.
For LLC t-stat, all reported values were distributed N(0,1) under null of unit root or no cointegration.
Given the results of LLC, IPS, and MW tests, it is possible to apply panel cointegration methodology in order to 
test for the existence of a stable long-run relation among the variables. 
PANEL COINTEGRATION TESTS
The next step was to test whether the variables are 
cointegrated using Pedroni’s (1999, 2001, 2004) 
methodology as described previously for Model 1 
Model 2. This was to investigate whether a long-
run steady state or cointegration exists among the 
variables and to confirm what Oh, Kim, Kim, and 
Ahn, (1999) and Coiteux and Olivier (2000) stated 
that the panel cointegration tests have much higher 
testing power than the conventional cointegration 
test. Since the variables were found to be integrated 
in the same order I(1), we continued with the panel 
cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (1999, 
2001, 2004). Cointegrations were carried out for 
constant and constant plus time trend, and the 
summary of the results of cointegration analyses 
are presented in Table 2. 
 In constant level, we found that Model 
1, which is with the interaction term, indicates 
that only one out of seven statistics reject the null 
hypothesis of non-cointegration at the 1% level of 
significance. While in Model 2, there was none 
of seven statistics that reject the null hypothesis. 
In the panel cointegration test for Model 1 and 
Model 2 with constant plus trend level, the 
results indicated that five out of seven statistics 
reject the null hypothesis of non-cointegration at 
the 1% level of significance. It was shown that 
independent variables do hold cointegration in the 
long run for a group of 13 Asian countries with 
respect to real per capita GDP.  However, since all 
the statistics conclude in favour of cointegration, 
and this, combined with the fact that according 
to Pedroni (1999) the panel non-parametric (t-
statistic) and parametric (adf-statistic) statistics 
are more reliable in constant plus time trend, we 
concluded that there is a long-run cointegration 
among our variables in 13 Asian countries.
 Overall in Table 2, we found that most of 
the panel statistics were more reliable in constant 
plus time trend compared to the panel statistics in 
constant. As indicated by the panel non-parametric 
(t-statistic) and parametric (adf-statistic) statistics 
as well as group statistics that are analogous 
to the IPS-test statistics, the null hypothesis of 
non-cointegration was rejected at the 1% level 
of significance. These results also implied that 
taken as a group, the theory of growth through 
augmented Solow model for Model 1 and Model 
2 does hold over the estimation period. 
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Table 2: Panel Cointegration Tests for Heterogeneous Panel (Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita GDP)
Constant Constant + Trend
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Panel-v -2.24 -2.40 3.795* 2.886*
Panel-ρ   3.15 3.34 3.897 4.598
Panel-t 2.50 2.97 -1.932* -2.148*
Panel-adf 2.72 2.24 -1.795* -1.824*
Group-ρ   4.31 4.01 4.627 4.973
Group-t    -1.76 1.83 -2.676* -2.212*
Group-adf -2.62* 2.11 -2.043* -1.892*
Notes. All statistics are from Pedroni’s procedure (1999) which is the adjusted values can be compared to the N(0,1) 
distribution. The Pedroni (2004) statistics are one-sided tests with a critical value of 1.64 (k < -1.64 implies rejection 
of the null), except the u-statistic that has a critical value of 1.64 (k > 1.64 suggests rejection of the null). 
*, ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no-cointegration at 1%, and 5%, level of significance, 
respectively.
Cointegration Estimation Results – FMOLS
The previous section already confirmed that 
all variables in two equations (two models) 
are cointegrated. In other words, a long-run 
equilibrium exists among the variables. This 
section discusses the estimated long-run 
equation. Following Pedroni (2000, and 2001), 
cointegrating explanatory variables for the data 
was estimated using the Fully Modified OLS 
(FMOLS) technique. In Table 3 and Table 4, 
results are reported for within group (within-
demension) FMOLS and panel group (between-
dimension) FMOLS estimators without and with 
common time dummies. 
 Within group in Table 3, within group 
FMOLS results without time dummies, all 
variables in Model 1 and Model 2 reported tests 
that reject the null hypotheses at the 1% and 
5% levels of significance. Panel group FMOLS 
showed that all variables in Model 1 and Model 
2 reported tests that reject the null hypotheses 
at the 1% and 5% levels of significance. For the 
aggregate of government expenditure (lnGE), 
the estimate of coefficient was positive [0.07 
and 0.72 (within group) and 1.06 and 0.88 (panel 
group)] and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in within group and statistically significant 
at the 1% level in panel group. Therefore, there 
is presence of a long-run relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP. The estimate 
of the coefficient for the aggregate of other fiscal 
variables (lnOFV) was positive [0.02 (within 
group) and 0.02 and 0.04 (panel group)] and 
statistically significant at the 5% level in within 
group and statistically significant at the 1% level 
in panel group. The aggregate of other fiscal 
variables positively affect growth and there is a 
long-run cointegration between the aggregate of 
other fiscal variables and economic growth.  
 There was a positive coefficient [0.43 
and 0.52 (within group) and 0.05 and 0.10 (panel 
group)] and statistically significant at the 5% 
(within group) and 1% (panel group) level for 
institutions )(ln ins  in Model 1 and Model 2. 
Thus, there is a long-run cointegration between 
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institutions and economic growth. The estimate of 
the coefficient for the savings in physical capital 
(investment) )(ln ks was positive [0.13 and 0.16 
(within group) and 0.12 and 0.16 (panel group)] 
and statistically significant at the 5% level in within 
group and statistically significant at the 1% level 
in panel group. We concluded that investment and 
economic growth have a long-run cointegration. 
The coefficient on population growth (ln(n+g+δ)) 
was negative [-0.20 (within group) and -0.49 and 
-0.37 (panel group)] and statistically significant 
at the 5% level in within group and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in panel group. Both 
groups showed that there is still a long-run 
cointegration between population growth and 
economic growth, and population growth has 
an adverse effect on economic growth. The 
interaction term between institutions and aggregate 
of government expenditure (lnGE*INS)  and 
institutions and aggregate of other fiscal variables 
(lnOFV*INS) had positive coefficients (0.32 and 
0.02 (within group) and 0.34 and 0.02 (panel 
group)) and statistically significant at the 5% and 
1% level in within group and panel group for 
Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. We concluded 
that the aggregate of government expenditure 
and aggregate of fiscal policy variables, which 
interact with the institutions variable, have a 
potential impact on long-run steady-state levels 
of growth. Thus, there is a long-run cointegration 
between aggregate of government expenditure 
and aggregate of fiscal policy variables that 
interact with institutions variable and economic 
growth. Again we found that while the inclusion 
of an interaction term between aggregate of 
government expenditure and institutions, and 
aggregate of fiscal policy and institutions as an 
added regressor in the growth equations (Model 
1 and Model 2), do not generally affect the sign 
or absolute magnitude of the estimates, they are 
not less precisely estimated than their counterparts 
in Model 1 or Model 2. 
 Comparing the results reported in within 
group and panel group, we found that the panel 
groups give higher values of estimation coefficient 
and higher values of significance (1% level) which 
would be a more accurate representation of the 
average long-run relationship. Therefore, we 
concluded that all variables are cointegrated and 
there is long-run relationship.
Table 3: FMOLS Results, Without Time Dummies (Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita)
Within Group Panel Group
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
lnGE 0.07**(2.20) 1.06*(-3.56) 0.88*(11.19) 0.72**(2.65)
lnOFV 0.02**(-2.50) 0.02*(-4.69) 0.04*(-6.86) 0.02**(-2.49)
lnins 0.43**(-1.94) 0.05*(-4.71) 0.10*(-10.09) 0.52**(-2.87)
lnS
k
0.13**(-1.99) 0.12*(-4.46) 0.16*(-4.95) 0.16**(-2.32)
ln(n+g+δ) -0.20**(-2.37) -0.49*(-5.01) -0.37*(-5.65) -0.20**(-2.28)
ln(GE*INS) 0.32**(2.81) 0.34*(3.40) - -
ln(OFV*INS) - - 0.02*(-4.52) 0.02**(-2.04)
Note: The null hypothesis for the t-ratio is H
0
=β
i
=0; Figures in parentheses are t-statistics;
(*) and (**) significant with 95% (90%) confidence level;
 “within-dimension” reports Pedroni (1996) weighted within-dimension adjusted-FM;
“between-dimension” reports Pedroni (1996, 2000) group mean panel FMOLS.
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 Table 4 presents the results of within 
group and panel group FMOLS with time 
dummies, respectively. In within group, all 
variables reported that tests rejected the null 
hypotheses of non- cointegration at the 1% and 
5% level of significance. On the other hand, 
panel group showed that all variables reported 
that tests rejected the null hypotheses of non-
cointegration at the 1% level of significance. For 
the aggregate of government expenditure (lnGE), 
the estimate of coefficient is positive [0.29 and 
2.08 (within group) and 2.23 and 2.53 (panel 
group)] and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in within group and statistically significant 
at the 1% level in panel group. Therefore, there 
is a presence of a long-run relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP. The estimate 
of the coefficient for the aggregate of other fiscal 
variables (lnOFV) is positive [0.04 and 0.09 
(within group) and 0.02 and 0.48 (panel group)] 
and statistically significant at the 5% level in 
within group and statistically significant at the 
1% level in panel group. The aggregate of other 
fiscal variables positively affect growth and there 
is a long-run cointegration between the aggregate 
of fiscal policy and economic growth.  
Table 4: FMOLS Results, With Time Dummies (Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita)
Within Group Panel Group
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
lnGE 0.29**(-1.99) 2.23*(-4.76) 2.53*(11.11) 2.08**(2.15)
lnOFV 0.04*(4.39) 0.02*(-3.62) 0.48*(-3.60) 0.09*(3.36) 
lnins 1.17*(4.60) .25*(-3.34) 1.64*(-4.30) 1.21*(3.60)
lnS
k
0.14**(-2.24) 0.25*(-3.50) 0.21*(-3.09) 0.16**(-2.32) 
ln(n+g+δ) -0.21**(2.37) -0.29*(-5.98) -0.27*(-5.09) -0.19**(2.28) 
ln(GE*INS) 0.28**(-2.55) 0.50*(-5.13) - -
ln(OFV*INS) - - 0.14*(-6.14) 0.22**(-2.04)
Note: The null hypothesis for the t-ratio is H
0
=β
i
=0; figures in parentheses are t-statistics;
(*) and (**) significant with 95% (90%) confidence level;
 “within-dimension” reports Pedroni (1996) weighted within-dimension adjusted-FM;
“between-dimension” reports Pedroni (1996, 2000) group mean panel FMOLS.
 There was a positive coefficient [1.17 
and 1.21 (within group) and 0.25 and 1.64 (panel 
group)] and statistically significant at the 1% level 
for institutions )(ln ins  in Model 1 and Model 
2. Thus, there is a long-run cointegration between 
institutions and economic growth. The estimate of 
the coefficient for the savings in physical capital 
(investment) )(ln ks was positive [0.14 and 0.16 
(within group) and 0.25 and 0.21 (panel group)] 
and statistically significant at the 5% level in 
within group and statistically significant at the 
1% level in panel group. We concluded that 
investment and economic growth have a long-
run cointegration. The coefficient on population 
growth )(ln( δ++ gn was negative [-0.21 and 
-0.19 (within group) and -0.29 and -0.27 (panel 
group)] and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in within group and statistically significant 
at the 1% level in panel group. Both tables 
show that there is still a long-run cointegration 
between population growth, and economic 
growth and population growth has an adverse 
effect on economic growth. The interaction term 
between institutions and aggregate of government 
expenditure (lnGE*INS), and institutions and 
aggregate of other fiscal variables (lnOFV*INS) 
had positive coefficients [0.28 and 0.22 (within 
group) and 0.50 and 0.14 (panel group)] and 
statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level 
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in within group and panel group for Model 
1 and Model 2, respectively. We concluded 
that aggregate of government expenditure and 
aggregate of fiscal policy variables interact with 
institutions variable and have a potential impact on 
long-run steady-state levels of growth. Thus, there 
is a long-run cointegration between aggregate of 
government expenditure and aggregate of fiscal 
policy variables which interact with institutions 
variable and economic growth. Comparing the 
results reported in within group and panel group, 
we found that the panel groups give higher values 
of estimation coefficient and higher values of 
significance (1% level) which would be a more 
accurate representation of the average long-run 
relationship. Therefore, we concluded that all 
variables are cointegrated and there is a long-run 
relationship.
 Overall, our  results in Table 3 and 
Table 4 show that the within group’s estimator 
without and with time dummies almost have 
a coefficient of panel relative to all variable 
levels and are statistically significant at 1% 
and 5% levels. Meanhile, for the panel group’s 
estimator without and with time dummies have the 
coefficient of panel relative to all variable levels 
and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
It is interesting to note that panel group FMOLS 
estimators consistently produce larger estimates 
than do the within group estimators. Therefore, our 
results support Pedroni’s (2001) arguments that 
the panel groups estimators produce consistent 
estimates of the average slope under the alternative 
hypothesis that the slopes are different from one 
another and vary across countries, whereas the 
within groups estimators do not.  
CONCLUSION
Several important conclusions can be drawn 
from the study. Firstly, our study attempted to 
identify the important role of institutions, which 
is government anti-diversion policies with a 
weighted average of (i) corruption in government, 
(ii) rule of law, (iii) bureaucratic quality, (iv) 
repudiation of government contract, and (v) 
expropriation risk determinants of economic 
growth rates in a sample of 13 Asian countries. 
While the inclusion of institutions as an added 
regressor in the growth equations does not 
generally affect the sign or absolute magnitude of 
the estimates, they are not less precisely estimated 
than their counterparts. This is not surprising 
given that institutions are positively correlated 
with some of the regressors. The results from the 
analysis are significant, and provide support for 
the historical evidence presented by North and 
Thomas (1973), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), 
and North (1990). They showed that the security of 
property rights provides incentives for economic 
growth in the world. Secure role of institutions 
also lead to an efficient allocation of government 
expenditure and fiscal policy.
 Secondly, this study provided another 
framework of a set of linkages to capture most 
of the important interaction among economic 
growth, institutions, government expenditure, 
and fiscal policy. Economic indicator especially 
interacts with non-economic indicator. The 
positive results of the effect of interaction term 
between the aggregate of government expenditure 
and institutions, and the aggregate of fiscal policy 
and institutions on economic growth in 13 Asian 
economies are really interesting. These interaction 
terms as an added regressor in the growth 
equations do not generally affect the sign or 
absolute magnitude of the estimates; they are not 
less precisely estimated than their counterparts. 
This result support earlier findings from other 
researchers who stated that typically economic 
agents in models of interaction are thought of 
as being placed on a lattice and interacting with 
their neighbours (Durlauf, 1990, Benabou, 1996, 
Blume, 1993, Ellison, 1993, Brock & Durlauf 
2001).
 Thirdly, we assessed the empirical 
evidence on the link between fiscal policy and 
growth by considering five policy areas: public 
sector wages and salaries, expenditure on other 
goods and services, transfers and subsidies, 
interest payment on government debt, capital 
expenditure (minus government expenditure on 
health, education and defence), tax revenues, 
non-tax revenue, and grant. The analyses of fiscal 
policy in 13 Asian economies showed that the 
authorities do make active use of fiscal policy. 
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This implies that fiscal policy is practically 
possible and can be effective in influencing the 
real per capita GDP. There is thus a rationale for 
fiscal policy. 
 We also assessed the empirical evidence 
on the link between government expenditure and 
growth by considering three expenditure areas: 
health expenditure, education expenditure and 
defence expenditure. The analyses of government 
expenditure in 13 Asian economies showed that 
the authorities do make active use of government 
expenditure even though there are very limited 
areas. This implies that government expenditure 
is practically possible and can be effective in 
influencing the real per capita GDP. 
 Fourthly, we estimated our equation 
(Model 1 and Model 2) using Fully Modified OLS 
(OLS) as proposed by Pedroni (2000), and found 
a positive and statistically significant impact of 
aggregate of government expenditure, aggregate 
of fiscal policy, institutions, and interaction term 
(between aggregate of government expenditure 
and institutions, aggregate of fiscal policy and 
institutions), and savings in physical capital 
(investment) on economic growth. On the other 
hand, we found that the population growth rate 
is negative and significantly related to GDP per 
capita. 
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